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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
l)LAIN CITY IRRIGATION COMPANY, 
Plaintiff 
vs. 
HOOPER IRRIGATION COMPANY, 
a corporation, et al, 
Defendants 
Lynne Irrigation Company, Inc. 
North Ogden Irrigation Company, Inc. 
Western Irrigation Company, Inc. 
Plain City Irrigation Company, Inc. 
Utah State Engineer 
Appellants 
PETITION FOR REHEARING 
Comes now The North Ogden Irrigation Company, 
Western Irrigation Company, Lynne Irrigation Com-
pany, Plain City Irrigation Company, and the Utah 
State Engineer, Appellants in the above cause and 
respectfully petition this court for a rehearing in the 
cause, for the reasons and upon the following grounds: 
I. 
THE COURT ERRED IN HOLDING IN EFFECT 
THAT THE RESERVOIR CONTAINS TWO 
CLASSES OF WATER - ONE CLASS BEING AL-
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LOCATED TO THE L.OWEi.R USERS UNDER PARA-
GRAPH 7 (A) OF THE DECREE, AND THE OTHER 
CLASS NOT BEING SO ALL·OCATE.D. 
II .. 
THE COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT r~rHE 
CLAIM.S OF THE APPELLANTS, IF UPHELD, 
PRODUCE AN INEQUITABLE RESUL.T. 
BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF PETITION 
FOR REHEARING 
The fact that we are here confronted by a court 
which is itself divided in its conclusions places a double 
responsibility upon us as attorneys of the bar of this 
court. First, the responsibility and duty of further 
advocating the position of our clients, so ably stated in 
the dissenting opinion of 11:r. Justice Callister, and, sec-
ond, the responsibility of treading the narrow margin 
between respect for the decision of the majority of the 
court, and honorabl~e disagreement therewith. 
The majority opinion, as we read it, rests upon two 
propositions, neither of which finds support in the 
record. The first is that the so-called "power water" 
is water separate and distinct from the water which 
the decree operates upon. The second is that to subject 
the power water to the decree produces an inequitable 
result which should be avoided if the decree n1ay other-
wiS'e be reasonably interpreted. 
This petition is limited to these t\YO points, and we 
respectfully petition the court to give further consider-
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ation thereto to the end that the court, in seeking to ar-
rive at what it conceives to be an equitable result, does 
not deny the lower users that which is theirs as a matter 
of la,v. 
ARGUMENT 
I. 
OGDEN RIVER WATER USERS ASSOCIATION 
HAS BUT ONE CLASS OF WATER, ALL OF 
WHICH IS SUBJECT TO THE DECRE1E 
At the outset the court should have it clearly in 
mind that the so-called "power water", which has been 
so designated sol'ely for the purpose of identification, 
does not find itself from a source separate and apart 
from the source of the other water in the reservoir. All 
of the water comes from what the majority opinion refers 
to as the "normal recharge of the basin". In the year 
1959, this normal recharge produced a total of 30,915 
acre feet, and it was all available for storage in the 
res'ervoir. The power water was not in addition to this 
normal recharge, but was a part of it. However, the 
Power Company had the right to require the release 
to it for power purposes of 15,015 acre feet of this 
total. If this right were exercised the amount of water 
ren1aining for the stockholders of the Association would 
be reduced by this amount. On the other hand, if the 
Power Company's right of release was not exercised, 
the Association would have th'e full 30,915 acre feet. 
Accordingly, and at the request of the Association, the 
Power Company for a consideration of $1.28 per acre 
foot waived its right of release, and the Association 
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thereby became entitled to the ·use of the full 30,915 
acre feet. The majority opinion speaks of this as being 
"additional water purchased from the power company", 
which we believe inaccurately describes the transaction, 
but wh~ether it was in fact a sale of water, or a waiver 
of a right, perhaps is not important. What is important 
is that the water involved was not "additional" to the 
normal recharge, but was a·part of the normal recharge. 
Thus we believe that this court became, as was the lower 
court, led astray by accepting th·e City's characterization 
of the water as "additional water". 
Another point which the majority must have over-
looked, although the same has never been denied by 
the City, is that th~e Association, in discharge of its 
duties to its stockholders to attempt to provide an acre 
foot of water per share of stock, is not limited to a 
particular source, but has broad powers to obtain such 
water from any source. And having obtained such 
water it holds the same, and the whole thereof, for the 
pro-rata use of its shareholders. No shareholder is 
preferred as against others, but each share "is entitled" 
(to use the language of the decree) to an equal pro-rata 
share of the Association's water, which in the year 1959 
was 30,915 acre feet. Thus we have the situation where 
each share was entitled to 1/44,1'75 of 30,915 acre feet, 
or approximately .7 acre foot per share, and the 4,500 
shares we are here concerned with were entitl~ed to 4,500 
x . 7, or a total of 3,150 acre feet. The narrow question 
then is "who is to receive the 3,150 acre feet represented 
by these 4,500 shares~" Or, to state it another way~ 
"who is to receive the 3,150 acre feet to which these 
shares is ~en ti tied"~ 
'4 
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The lower court specifically found that the po,ver 
water was "not subject to the decree", and we assun1e 
that this court in affirming the lower court confirmefl 
that finding. But if we accept th'e- premise, which even 
the City has not denied, that the power water is water 
which inures to shareholders of the Association the 
same as any other water of the Association, then this 
finding by th'e lower court fails, because the decree by 
its terms operates upon all water of the Association 
which inures to the Association's shareholders. Frankly, 
we believe that if the decision of the lower court, as 
affirmed by this court, is valid, it must be upon tire 
ground that the decree does not allocate the power 
water to the lower users, not upon the proposition that 
the power "\vater is not subject to decree. This is prob-
ably what the majority of this court was attempting by 
its emphasis upon the word "is" in the decree, rather 
than excluding the water from the decre'e as did the 
lower court. We believe, however, that the hidden fal-
lacy in this premise likewise may be- demonstrated. 
The decree by its terms provides then in exchange 
for the water from the wells "the City set apart the 
water to which it is entitled upon 4,500 shares of stock". 
It further provides, "That the water represented by 
said 4,500 shares of stock shall be distributed to the 
water (lower) users". The so-called power water, as 
well as any other water of the Association, is certainly 
water "represented" by the 4,500 sharles, and is likewise 
water to which the City "is entitled" under such shares, 
because the City has no right to any Association water 
except by and under its shares of stock. How then is 
this power water allocated by the decree1 Is it to the 
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lower users, as is other water, or is it excluded from 
the allocation as held by th'e majority of this court 1 
To exclude it from the allocation requires an in-
terpretation of the phrase "is entitled" in the narrowest 
sense, namely, in the s·ense of "the water then avail-
able", as stated by the majority, and this narrow con-
struction is justified by the Court to the end of produc-
ing "a fair and equitable result". That is an absolute 
non sequitur we will show under Point II of this Petition, 
but we accept it for the moment to the end of showing 
where the narrow interpretation of "is entitled" leads, 
because if it is to be narrowly construed at all it must 
so be for all purposes - not first narrowly and then 
loosely to reach a desired 'end. 
When the majority holds that the phrase "is entit-
led" relates to "the water then available', it means, of 
course, that water availabl·e at the time the decree was 
entered, namely, April 1, 1948. While the record is 
silent as to the exact amount of water then available, 
we doubt not but that the court will acknowledge from 
·experience that the water "then available" was at its 
lowest. The reservoir had been emptied, or substan-
tially so, from the previous years' use, and the spring 
run off was but commencing. The a1nount of water 
"then available" was minimal, but the amount thereof 
as of that date can be obtained from the Association's 
records. Under this decision as it now stands the City 
can from the Association's records determine just what 
that amount then was in terms of acre f·eet (in fact it 
was but 1,128 acre feet as shown by the Association's 
daily storage records) and insist that it was but a pro-
rata portion of this minimal an1ount of water only 
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that \va~ allocated to the lower users under the decree, 
and for which th~e City receives in return the year 
round flow of 22 second feet from the wells. We are, 
of eourse, satisfied that neither this court nor the ·city 
itself intended this drastic result, but the majority 
opinion of the court neeessarily puts the parties in 
the position where it may be claimed. 
Actually the decision as written extends even fur-
ther than that. The majority of the court in allocating 
the \Yater under the decree to that "then available" 
further observes that "no future tense appears in the 
language used and no reference is made to the future". 
Obviously the purport of this language, even though it 
may not have been the intendment of the court, is that 
the allocation of water to the lower users was strictly 
that water then available, namely, on April 1, 1948, 
with no provision for the future and no provision for 
future years. The result is that even an annual allocat-
ion to the lower users is denied, and they are held to 
have had only the right to a proportionate share of the 
water available to the Association on the date of the de-
cree, and none ther:eafter. And this still isn't the end of 
the matter, for the purport of the decision must be 
pursued to its logical conclusion! 
If the lower users are restricted to the allocation 
of the water "then available", then what the lower users 
gave to Ogden City "in exchange' therefor must of 
necessity be likewise restricted, and what we have is 
Ogden City receiving the right to the use of the wells 
in the year 1948, and the lower users receiving an allo-
cation of storage water in the year 1948. In other 
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words, the decree provides not a permanent solution of 
the problem at all, but only a solution for the year 1948. 
We recognize that in thus presenting the matter 
we may be charged with arguing the ridiculous, but we 
submit that once the decree is limited to water "then 
available", the consequences we have developed above 
of necessity result. 
What then is the answer' We submit it lies in this 
court acknowledging by further decision in this case 
that its narrow application of the phrase "is 'entitled", 
to only such water as was "then available", was erron-
eous, and that some further interpretation must be 
given .thereto. To do this the court must say that the 
water the decree was allocating to the lower users was 
not only the minimal amount then in the reservoir, to 
which the shares were then entitled, but also some 
further water the Association might in the future from 
time to time acquire. 
Certainly this is what the court intended, at least 
as to water accumulated and acquired from the natural 
flow of the river, but to make that intention manif'est 
a further statement thereon is required of this court. 
But once the court acknowledges that \Yater over and 
above the miniinal amount in the reservoir as of the 
date of the decree was in fact allocated to the lower 
users under the decree, where can it logically stopT 
Can it say that the additional "Tater which the decree 
operates upon is only the flow from the river which 
inures to the Association under Right Number 397 in 
the na1ne of the United States~ How can it say that 
and yet exclude water the us·e of \Yhich the Association 
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aequired through agreement with the Power Company 
under Right 37, or to any other water which the Associ-
ation n1ay lawfully acquire~ 
We submit that if this court acknowledges, as 
\Ve believe in fairness it must, that the decree is not 
lilnited in its allocation of water to the lower users to 
that a1nount of water which was as of April 1, 1948, 
Hthen available", then the court must further acknow-
ledge that the position of the lower users and of the 
State Engin'eer throughout these proceedings was cor-
rect, and that there is no basis under the decree, either 
in law or in fact, for saying that the decree allocates 
some of the water of the Association to which thle 
4,500 shares are entitled, but not all of the water to 
"\vhich the shares are entitled. 
That this does not result in an inequity to the 
City which the Court sought to avoid we will now show. 
II. 
THE COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE 
CLAIMS OF THE DEFENDANTS AND 
RESPONDENTS PRODUCE AN 
INEQUITABLE RESULT. 
At the outset we would observe that the paragraph 
of the decree we are here concerned with was entered 
by the Court upon stipulation of the parties, and 
whether it was advised or ill advised as to any party 
is not presently of primary importance. As stated by 
the majority opinion it is only where there is doubt 
as to the interpretation of an agreement that questions 
of fairnless and equity play any part in its interpre-
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tation. We will, accordingly, assume with the court, 
but without admitting, that there is some doubt as to 
just what the parties intended, and from there consider 
the equity of the claim of the lower users as compared 
to the result reached by the majority of the court. 
We have already seen what may well happen to 
the lower users if the majority opinion to the effect 
that the decree allocates only water "th~en available" 
remains unmodified. Under this decision the City may 
well contend that it has heretofore been over gen'erous 
to the lower users, and that hereafter by virtue of this 
decision all they are entitl'ed to receive and will receive 
(if any at all) is but a fractional part of some minimal 
quantity of water, measured by the amount of water 
actually available as of April 1, 1948. We assume 
however that any possibility of that contingency arising 
will be eliminated by further action by this court. 
E!ven so, and assu1ning the right of the lower users 
is extended to include each year all water available to 
the Association under Right 397, equity is not done 
by excluding water otherwise acquired by the Associ-
ation. To get the matter in proper perspective an 
understanding of the situation as of the time the stipu-
lation was agreed to must be had. 
For many years prior thereto the lo,ver users were 
claiming the prior right to the flow from the wells, and 
this claim had been the subject of long standing liti-
gation between them and the City. The lower users 
clain1ed the water for irrigation~ 'vhereas the City d~­
sired it for eulinary purposes, as it was suitable for 
drinking. To settle and to solve the matter in such 
10 
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a way as would enable the City to utilize the well water 
for drinking purposes, and at the same time provide the 
lo,ver users during the irrigation season with a com-
parable quantity of irrigation water, the parties agr:eed 
to an exchange. To effect this solution the City agreed 
to deliver to the lower users Association water, the 
right to the use of which the City had by virtue of 
-t,;>OO shares of stock the City held in the Association. 
'"rhese shares were at all times to be held and main-
tained by the City, but the water thereunder was to 
be released to the lower users. In return or "in ex-
change" therefor, the City was to have th:e year round 
right to the flow from the wells (possibly limited dur-
ing some 1nonths to 22 second feet daily average flow), 
but notwithstanding such limitation, the right to the 
use of in excess of 15,000 acr~e feet of water annually 
fron1 the \Veils. In other words, with a full reservoir 
in Pineview the lower users were to receive annually 
4,500 acre fe·et of irrigation water, and the City up to 
15,000 acre feet of culinary water. Certainly the City 
\Vas not taken advantage of in that transaction. 
But, says the majority opinion, if the City is re-
quired to participate, through the payment of assess-
ments, in any special costs incurr:ed by the Association 
in attempting to provide a full reservoir and a full 
acre foot of water per share, an inequity develops 
against it. With this we cannot agree. 
Under the Articles of Incorporation of the Associ-
ation ·each share of stock is entitled to its pro-rata share 
of the fill of the reservoir.. As there are 44,175 shares, 
and the Association capacity in the reservoir is 44,175 
acre feet, each share becomes :entitled to a maximum of 
1 1 
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one acre foot. So unless it be assu1ned that the Associ-
ation is going out and obligate itself for water in excess 
of that which it has capacity to store, and to ass:ess its 
present shareholders therefor, the maximum obligation 
the City is under is to pay its pro-rata share under 
its 4,500 shares of the cost to the Association of filling 
the reservoir. Wher·e is the inequity and where is the 
unfairness to the City in that~ In those occasional 
years when the reservoir does not fill under Right 397, 
and the Association acquires water from some source, 
the City will be put to some added cost. But even 
in those years the City is still getting upward of 15,000 
acre feet of culinary water from the wells, something 
worth i1nmeasurably more than any added costs to the 
City incu~red in the acquisition of additional irrigation 
water, particularly in years of short supply. To find 
an in:equity to the City under those circumstances re-
quires a finding of inequity merely because the court 
conceives that the City made an improvident bargain 
in agreeing to subject the water to "\vhich its 4,500 shares 
are ·entitled to the use of the lower users. 
Even if the court desires to assume that the Associ-
ation might in the future in desregard of its duties 
to its shareholders, and particularly over the protests 
of the City, as the major shareholder, seek to obligate 
the Association for water in excess of its reservoir 
capacity and assess a portion of the costs to these 
4,500 shares, the resulting inequity to the City would 
be minor in comparison to the inequities this court 
forces upon the lower users by its majority decision. 
Let's examine that side of the coin. 
12 
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The court recognizes, of course, that the wells in 
question are fed from an artesian basin lying beneath 
'rhat is now Pineview Reservoir. This basin gets its 
reeharge from the flow of Ogden River. The first 
run off each year of necessity goes to the recharge of 
the basin, and it is only after the basin gains its recharge 
that surplus run off develops for storage in the reser-
voir. Thus in a short year like 1959 the basin is 
filled and the City gets its full supply from the wells, 
and it is only the storage that suffers the shortage. 
Thus the preferment in every year is in favor of the 
City, and the weighing of the preferment the City gets 
through having the water from the wells, as against 
the occasional added annual charge to the City, demon-
strates that the benefits to the City far exceed the 
burdens. 
One further point should perhaps be commented 
upon. The majority opinion attribut1es significance 
to the fact that some of the lower users are shareholders 
in the Association and as such are in a position to en-
courage the Association to buy additional water. By 
the same token the City is a shar1eholder to the extent 
of 10,000 shares and in a far better position to dis-
courage any such purchase. The court does not com-
ment upon the size of the share holdings of the lower 
users as compared to those of the City, and indeed we 
doubt that it is a part of the record, but we can assure 
the court, for what it is worth, that the aggregate 
holdings of the lower users is but a fractional part of 
the holdings of the City. 
13 
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CONCLUSION 
We strongly urge that the majority of this court 
erred in its conclusions in this rna tter, first, in holding 
that the decree operated to allocate to the lower users 
only water "then available", and did not extend to 
water subsequently acquired in the year 1959 for the 
purpose of augumenting the then short supply, and, 
secondly, in permitting its interpretation of the meaning 
of the decree to be influenced by what it conceived to 
be equities in favor of the City. 
While we have attempted to present our own views 
with cogency, we have intended no offense to those 
who may still disagree with us. Petitions for rehear-
ing are to the writer among the more difficult tasks he 
called upon to perform, as they are of necessity directed 
against the logic and reasoning of members of thls 
court. We may, however, and do on occasion, honestly 
disagree with this court, but such disagreement affects 
in no way our respect for those who judge us, and it 
is in that spirit that this petition is presented. We 
respectfully request that it be granted. 
Respectfully Submitted, 
HOWELL, STINE & OLMSTEAD 
By NEIL R. OLMSTEAD 
DAVID K. HOLTHER 
WALTER L. BUDGE 
Attorney General 
Attorneys for Appellants 
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